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Surrogate Taxation and the Second-Best Answer to 
the In-Kind Benefit Valuation Riddle 
Jay A. Soled 
For well over a century, theorists have debated how the receipt of in-
kind benefits, such as meals and lodging furnished for the convenience 
of an employer and business entertainment opportunities, should be 
taxed. While debate participants have generally agreed that the receipt 
of such in-kind benefits constitutes income, the question has remained 
about whether to value such benefits at fair market value or at the 
recipient’s subjective value or to use some other metric. Because of 
administrative considerations in determining the tax base, the Internal 
Revenue Code (Code) historically used a binary approach: either 
include the in-kind benefit at its fair market value or exclude it 
entirely. 
This analysis explores an intermediate approach known as surrogate 
taxation, a process by which one taxpayer bears another taxpayer’s tax 
burden. Over the past several decades, surrogate taxation has evolved 
and grown in prominence. It is now commonly used to tax the receipt of 
in-kind benefits (and other forms of income) in ways that produce 
outcomes that are more administrable, equitable, and efficient than the 
Code’s binary approach. While this analysis concludes that direct 
taxation is preferable to surrogate taxation, administrative concerns 
sometimes dictate that surrogate taxation is often a necessary substitute.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Problems associated with taxing the value of items received in 
kind rather than in cash have historically bedeviled and baffled both 
income tax theorists and administrators. Simply put, the problem is 
as follows: When taxpayers receive cash payments, such as salary 
emoluments, they have unlimited consumption opportunities, 
signaling that a tax on the amounts they received is appropriate. 
Conversely, when taxpayers receive in-kind benefits, such as business 
gifts, their consumption choices are typically constrained, signaling 
that a tax on the fair market value of the items they received is 
inappropriate. Nevertheless, in the latter case, there is little doubt 
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that the taxpayer has experienced a taxable accretion to wealth. But a 
riddle emerges: how much?  
In his foundational treatise, Personal Income Taxation, Henry C. 
Simons devoted an entire chapter to addressing this issue and 
attempting to solve the valuation riddle.1 Indeed, he tailored the 
precise terms of his famous definition of income partially to account 
for the receipt of in-kind benefits. Income, he asserted, consisted of 
the “market value of rights exercised in consumption” plus the 
change in wealth over the accounting period.2 Simons’s definition 
not only indicates that the value of things received beyond cash must 
be included in income, it also conveys Simons’s strong sense that the 
receipt of goods and services likewise constitutes income, and the 
appropriate metric for including services in income is their fair 
market value. 
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) generally adheres to 
Simons’s income definition. First, the Code defines the term income 
without any limitation,3 and the Treasury Regulations affirm that 
“[g]ross income . . . includes income realized in any form, whether 
in money, property, or services.”4 Second, in the context of taxable 
transactions, the Treasury Regulations specifically declare that the 
 
 1. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME 
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 110–25 (1st ed. 1938). In chapter 5, Simons addresses the 
difficulties of resolving this problem. However, Simons’s discussion of this problem is not 
confined to chapter 5 alone; it is also featured prominently in chapter 2, which explains the 
famous Haig-Simons income definition. See id. at 61–62. Other tax commentators have 
dwelled on this issue as well. See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal 
Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 880–85 
(discussing “psychic benefits,” such as those of the theater critic who enjoys plays, the teacher 
who likes to teach, or the lawyer who enjoys arguing cases). 
 Aside from Henry Simons, other theorists have posited definitions of income. See 
Richard B. Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME 
TAXATION (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) (offering an economic definition of the term 
income); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. 
REV. 679 (1988) (defining the term income based upon individual welfare); J.B. McCombs, 
An Historical Review and Analysis of Early United States Tax Policy Scholarship: Definition of 
Income and Progressive Rates, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 471 (1990) (offering a historical overview 
of several definitions of the term income and the role such definitions have played in shaping 
the Internal Revenue Code); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45 
(1990) (describing how the term income should be defined by principles of equity); Alvin C. 
Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980) 
(advocating a social product theory of the term income).  
 2. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 50. 
 3. I.R.C. § 61 (2006). 
 4. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (2010). 
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fair market value of what is received is the background valuation 
standard.5  
However, the Code sometimes departs from including income 
received in kind. For example, the tax rules do not require hotel 
managers to include in their gross income the value of lodging that 
hotels might provide to them to ensure their availability during off-
duty hours, nor do the rules require airline employees to include the 
value of in-flight meals that they are allowed to eat free of charge.6 
Relief from taxation on the full fair market value of the services and 
meals in these two cases appears justified because the in-kind benefit 
recipients (i.e., hotel managers and airline employees) likely derive 
less than full economic utility from such constrained consumption. 
Put somewhat differently, there often exists a palpable disparity 
between the fair market value of these items and the recipient’s 
subjective evaluation of these items’ economic worth.  
Returning to the riddle of how in-kind benefits should be taxed, 
it appears that the Code has historically adopted a binary approach. 
In some instances, if the in-kind benefit is remunerative in nature, 
the Code taxes it to the recipient at its full fair market value;7 in 
other instances, the Code does not tax the receipt of the in-kind 
benefit at all (as evidenced by the discussion in the prior paragraph).  
Upon closer inspection, however, Congress has adopted on 
many occasions a middle approach known as surrogate taxation. A 
surrogate tax is a process by which one taxpayer nominally bears tax 
as a proxy for another taxpayer’s receipt of income.8 Surrogate taxes 
come in a variety of forms, including deduction denials, excise taxes, 
and withholding taxes.9 At first glance, surrogate taxation seems all 
but unsatisfactory because it appears to be targeted at the wrong 
taxpayer (i.e., the one whose income is not increasing). However, 
 
 5. Id. § 1.61-2(d)(1). 
 6. See, e.g., Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937) (ruling that a hotel manager 
does not have to include as income the fair market value of his meals and lodging he receives 
while on the job). See generally I.R.C. § 119 (excluding the value of meals and lodging from 
employee’s income when such meals and lodging are provided for the convenience of the 
employer). 
 7. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-1(a), 1.61-2(d)(1). 
 8. See, e.g., Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty 
Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 349 n.26 (1989) (describing one form of “surrogate 
taxation” as follows: “Imposing severe dollar restrictions on a donor's deductions reduces the 
necessity of requiring a donee to include the value of business gifts in income.”). 
 9. See infra Part IV.  
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upon closer inspection, surrogate taxation has proven to be an 
effective tool for taxing income that might otherwise escape taxation, 
for minimizing deadweight losses to the economy, and for preserving 
the tax base.10 Despite its importance, surrogate taxation is a fairly 
ubiquitous Code practice that has basically been unexplored—at least 
until now.11 
This Article argues that Congress should employ surrogate 
taxation whenever (1) the taxpayer has experienced an accretion to 
wealth, (2) the application of a direct tax is not logistically feasible, 
and (3) the failure to tax would result in a serious misallocation of 
economic resources.12 In contrast, when all three of these conditions 
have not been met, Congress should refrain from imposing a 
surrogate tax.13 Once the decision to apply a surrogate tax is made, 
choosing the appropriate surrogate tax rate is the next challenge. In 
those instances when Congress believes that the in-kind benefit is 
likely to equal or approach the item’s fair market value in the 
employee’s hands,14 the surrogate tax rate generally should be set 
high on the marginal rate scale.15 Conversely, in those instances 
 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. Surrogate taxation has drawn academic attention and analytical rigor only in the 
sphere of issues as to the time value of money. See Charlotte Crane, More on Accounting for the 
Assumption of Contingent Liabilities on the Sale of a Business, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 615 (1997); 
Mary Louise Fellows, Future Costs Reconsidered: A Reevaluation of IRC Section 461(h), 44 
TAX NOTES 1531 (1989); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of 
Money,” 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986); see also JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: 
A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 74–75 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the 
ambiguity surrounding who actually bears tax burdens). 
 12. For example, see infra Part III for a detailed analysis of how these conditions are all 
met when it comes to business entertainment expenses, which has led Congress to enact I.R.C. 
§ 274(n) (2006).  
 13. For example, I.R.C. § 132(e) excludes the receipt of de minimis fringe benefits, 
such as employer-supplied coffee, from income. To date, Congress has not felt it necessary to 
employ surrogate taxation to capture this accretion to wealth in the employee’s hands. This 
hesitancy to tax is probably because the misallocation of economic resources is fairly 
insignificant (employers are generally not substituting free coffee in lieu of taxable wages) and 
the inequities, if any, are probably fairly minimal (perhaps the boss gets a better grade of java 
than the rank-and-file employees).  
 14. Put somewhat differently, while on the job, many employees receive goods and 
services that in some form or fashion cause an accession to personal wealth. The question is 
whether this accession to wealth should be taxed. If so, should the tax be direct or indirect 
(i.e., in the form of a surrogate tax)? 
 15. For example, I.R.C § 274(d), which is a form of surrogate taxation, denies a 
deduction for all business gifts (although this section permits a small de minimis deduction up 
to $25). This deduction disallowance will generally produce a surrogate tax equal to the 
donor’s highest marginal tax rate. To illustrate, suppose a donor provides a $1000 business gift 
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when Congress believes that the in-kind benefit is likely to be less 
than fair market value—but not negligible—the surrogate tax rate 
generally should be set low on the marginal rate scale.16  
In the Parts that follow, this Article will investigate the largely 
uncharted territory of surrogate taxation and its role in taxing in-
kind benefits and other forms of income that are not directly taxed in 
the hands of the recipient. Part II explores why a binary approach 
(i.e., tax versus no-tax) to taxing the receipt of in-kind benefits fails 
to produce equitable and efficient outcomes. Part III uses the 
business entertainment deduction limitation as a case study and then 
discusses surrogate taxation and its underlying rationales. Part IV 
surveys three different modes of surrogate taxation and their 
significance. Part V explains how surrogate taxation bolsters the 
Code’s equity, efficiency, and administrability in the varied 
circumstances in which Congress has used it. Finally, Part VI 
concludes. 
II. THE VALUATION RIDDLE OF TAXING IN-KIND BENEFITS 
As pointed out previously, the receipt of in-kind benefits is 
profoundly difficult to value.17 By way of comparison, consider when 
income is received in cash. In those instances, the taxpayer has 
complete control over the use of the funds and presumably will 
exchange those funds only for goods and services that yield as much 
utility (or more) as she would enjoy from keeping the cash or 
spending it on something else. Spelled out in terms of supply-and-
demand curves, a taxpayer’s preferences for the goods and services 
she actually consumes can be mapped on the portion of the demand 
curve that lies above the point at which the demand curve intersects 
 
to a good referral source. Under I.R.C. § 274(d), the donor cannot deduct the value of this 
gift. If the donor’s income were subject to tax at a thirty-five percent marginal tax rate, the 
donor (but not the business gift recipient) would bear an additional $350 of tax as a result of 
this deduction disallowance.  
 16. For example, I.R.C. § 274(n), which is a form of surrogate taxation, denies a fifty 
percent deduction for business entertainment expenses. This deduction limitation will produce 
an effective surrogate-tax rate generally equal to one-half of the provider’s highest marginal tax 
rate. To illustrate, suppose an employer provides a $1000 front-row concert ticket to an 
employee to use in taking a prospective client. Under I.R.C. § 274(n), the employer cannot 
deduct one-half of the ticket’s price. If the employer’s income were subject to tax at a thirty-
five percent marginal tax rate, the employer (but not the employee) would bear an additional 
$175 of tax as a result of this partial deduction disallowance. 
 17. See supra Part I. 
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the supply curve, signaling that the economic utility derived equals 













Next, consider the situation when a taxpayer receives in-kind 
goods or services (in the employment context, the taxpayer has no 
choice in the matter). There is no way to be sure where the 
taxpayer’s preferences lie, and thus there is no certain way to map 
them on the demand curve. On the one hand, his preferences may 
be above the market-price level. That is, the taxpayer’s preferences 
are for goods or services that he would have purchased with his cash 
earnings had someone else not provided them in kind (see diagram 
above). On the other hand, his preferences may be below the 
market-price level. That is, due to the timing, social company, and 
other factors associated with the receipt of these in-kind benefits, 
they do not constitute goods or services of the recipient’s choice. In 
the latter scenario, preferences for these goods and services can be 
mapped on the portion of the demand curve that lies below the 
point at which the demand curve intersects the supply curve, 
signaling that the economic utility derived equals or is less than the 
market price. 
Among economic theorists, there is little doubt that taxpayers 
who receive in-kind benefits are much more likely to value them 
below the market-price level. Indeed, much of Henry Simons’s 
treatise is devoted to a discussion of “Kleinwacher’s conundrums,”19 
the most famous of which involves a Flugel Adjutant, or military 
 
 18. Supply and Demand, WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 19, 2012), http://bit.ly/wGCt3q (giving a 
basic exposition of supply and demand curves). 
 19. Friedrich Kleinwacher, Das Einkommen und seine Verteilung, LEIPZIG 1–16 (1896) 
(cited in SIMONS, supra note 1, at 43, 53). 
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attaché,20 who must accompany the emperor, as a condition of his 
position, to the theater and opera even though he (the Flugel 
Adjutant) detests both.21 In determining the taxability of the Flugel 
Adjutant’s attendance at either form of entertainment, Simons labels 
this problem as “clearly hopeless.”22 In practice, however, the 
problem does not require much hope because it is unlikely to arise 
with any frequency, or at least not in dollar amounts of any 
significance. In a free market, taxpayers ordinarily would not choose 
to engage in occupations that force them to consume goods or 
services that they abhor. For example, taxpayers who dread flying are 
not ordinarily attracted to the airline industry, and those taxpayers 
who do not have a propensity for the thespian world are not likely to 
be lured into being theater ushers. As a practical reality, however, 
employees may engage in occupations that periodically or regularly 
cause them to consume goods that they perhaps slightly dislike or 
thoroughly disdain, signifying that they do not value the receipt of 
such goods at fair market value. But the fact that recipients do not 
necessarily value such benefits at fair market value does not mean 
that they attach no value at all to such items. And therein lies the 
crux of the problem: How should tax apply in situations when the 
taxpayer’s demand curve is below fair market value yet still above 
zero?  
Congress and the Treasury Department have sensibly eschewed 
the option of making individual assessments of subjective valuation 
of goods and services received in kind, if only because the 
administrative burdens of such assessments make that option 
inconceivable.23 Instead, the choice has historically been made 
 
 20. The modern counterpart would be a military attaché who accompanies the 
President carrying the “football” containing nuclear launch codes. This is mentioned in 
Ronald Reagan’s memoirs. See RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 257 (1990). 
 21. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 53. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Several commentators have noted that the theoretically correct answer—albeit one 
that is administratively impossible—is for employees to be taxed on the subjective value of in-
kind benefit. Halperin, supra note 1; William A. Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation 
Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip—A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. 
REV. 1099 (1966). But see Kim Brooks, Delimiting the Concept of Income: The Taxation of In-
Kind Benefits, 49 MCGILL L.J. 255 (2004) (explaining why the fair market value of the in-
kind benefit is the appropriate metric for income tax purposes). 
 In rare instances, individual valuation determinations under the Code are not unheard of. 
Consider the case of Turner v. Comm’r, 13 T.C.M. 462 (1954), in which the taxpayer won 
luxury cruise tickets with a retail value of $2200. In Turner, the tax court made the following 
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between one of two administrable rules: either full inclusion at fair 
market value (the background assumption under which Code § 61 
and treasury regulations were promulgated) or complete exclusion 
(as is the case of meals and lodging provided for the convenience of 
the employee).24  
While justifiable on administrative grounds, the full-inclusion 
versus full-exclusion response to the problem of receipts of in-kind 
benefits is clearly wrong, but in different ways. In those instances 
when such goods and services are included at fair market value, there 
is an overstatement of income, which both overtaxes the recipient 
and discourages what may be economically efficient transactions. 
Conversely, in those instances when such goods and services are 
excluded from income, there is an understatement of income, which 
under-taxes the recipient and functions as a powerful lure to 
employers to exploit economically inefficient transactions.  
An example helps to illustrate the issues with overstatement and 
understatement of income as articulated in the prior paragraph. 
Suppose a bakery generally sells nine baguettes each day at one dollar 
apiece. The bakery chooses to bake ten baguettes each day. This 
ceiling on baguette production is because the marginal cost of 
baking the tenth is twenty cents. Plus, usually one day in each five-
day workweek a customer purchases the tenth baguette. (Thus, the 
marginal cost of producing the tenth baguette is equal to its 
marginal revenue.)25 Every day, if the baguette is unsold at the time 
the bakery closes for the day, the bakery allows the store manager to 
take home the tenth baguette. Assume that there is no market for 
day-old baguettes. And assume further that the manager values the  
 
 
observation: “The winning of the tickets did not provide [the taxpayers] with something which 
they needed in the ordinary course of their lives and for which they would have made an 
expenditure in any event, but merely gave them an opportunity to enjoy a luxury otherwise 
beyond their means.” Id. at 463. In light of this observation, the taxpayers were allowed to 
take a smaller amount into income based, in part, on the subjective value the taxpayers put on 
the luxury cruise tickets. 
 24. In some instances, Congress has chosen an approach that offers a compromise 
between the two rules, though not one that involves individual valuation determinations. This 
analysis refers to this compromise as surrogate taxation, a topic that this Article explores in 
much greater depth in the sections that follow.  
 25. The figures in this example suggest that the bakery would be indifferent about the 
tenth baguette. But a reasonable additional assumption is that there is some intangible 
goodwill generated by not disappointing the tenth customer on those days when she shows up 
hoping to buy a baguette.  
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standby baguette, which is at the far edge of its use-by date, at thirty 
cents.  
Under these circumstances, consider two possible tax options: 
including the baguette in the store manager’s income at its full fair 
market value or, alternatively, excluding it from his income.  
If the baguette were included in the manger’s gross income, the 
manager would be taxed on the receipt of one dollar—the fair 
market value of the baguette. Taxing the manager in this fashion will 
result in over-taxation. He would have preferred as little as thirty-one 
cents of after-tax cash compensation to the baguette, but under this 
scenario he will be taxed on one dollar. If the manager’s marginal tax 
rate exceeds thirty percent, he will rationally decline the opportunity 
to take the baguette. This is because the tax cost associated with 
taking the baguette would be greater than the value he would receive 
from consuming it.26 The manager’s decision to decline the baguette 
will also occasion a deadweight loss to the economy since the tax 
system will have foiled an arrangement in which goods that cost only 
twenty cents would have passed to someone who attached a thirty-
cent value to them. And while equity and efficiency are typically 
viewed as competing goals in a good tax system,27 taxing the 
recipient on the item’s full, fair market value simultaneously thwarts 
both goals.  
Unfortunately, not taxing the standby baguette at all poses the 
risk of different—yet essentially symmetrical—errors. It would allow 
the manager to enjoy goods that he values at thirty cents without 
imposition of any tax, which is clearly unfair to other taxpayers who 
receive wages exclusively in cash. The absence of a tax being levied 
encourages employers to uncover and exploit opportunities to pass 
income to their employees in this tax-favored way. For example, 
strange as it might initially seem under a tax-free regime, the bakery 
might bake still another baguette every day, at its marginal cost of 
 
 26. Even if the bakery manager’s marginal tax rate were less than thirty percent, he 
would probably continue to take the bread but would have a stinging sense that it is barely 
worth it in light of a tax cost that approaches the subjective value of the bread. Depending 
upon the marginal tax rate imposed upon his income, the manager would face an effective tax 
rate that may approach 100 percent, even if it does not exceed that level. For example, if the 
manager’s marginal tax rate were twenty-five percent, he would pay a twenty-five-cent tax on a 
baguette that he values at thirty cents—the equivalent of imposing an eighty-three percent 
effective tax rate on the true value of what he perceived that he received. 
 27. See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY: THE BIG TRADE-OFF 
(1975). 
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twenty cents, to give to another employee who might attach only an 
eighteen-cent value to that baguette. This outcome begins to make 
sense, however, if that employee is also exposed to a marginal tax 
rate of thirty-five percent. More specifically, the bakery would have 
had to pay her nearly twenty-seven cents in cash to yield the eighteen 
cents of after-tax value produced by the baguette (0.27 − (0.27 × 
0.30)). That being the case, the bakery can save on labor costs by 
spending twenty cents (instead of twenty-seven cents) to produce an 
item that is valued at only eighteen cents by its recipient. Just like 
market-value inclusion, complete exclusion also produces an 
outcome that is both inequitable and inefficient.  
Between the binary worlds of full inclusion and full exclusion 
there exists a third alternative known as surrogate taxation—
commonplace when a recipient’s value of the in-kind benefit is 
unknown and a direct tax is impractical. By utilizing surrogate 
taxation, Congress can produce outcomes that are more equitable 
and efficient than a binary approach and function as a second-best 
alternative to using the taxpayer’s subjective value of in-kind benefits 
as an income metric.  
In terms of particulars, Congress could use one of the specified 
forms of surrogate tax detailed in this Article (i.e., denying a 
deduction, imposing an excise tax, or enforcing a withholding rule)28 
to impose a tax cost on the employer (e.g., in the prior example, the 
bakery) in lieu of taxing the recipient taxpayer (e.g., in the prior 
example, the bakery employee) who consumes the in-kind good or 
service. While surrogate taxes, because they are not calibrated to take 
into account the recipient taxpayer’s ability to pay tax,29 are less ideal 
than direct taxes, they nevertheless help curb inequities and 
inefficiencies and generally make the Code more administrable.30 
 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. This principle was long ago expressed by Adam Smith when he made the following 
assertion: “The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in 
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.” 2 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
414–15 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1869), available at http://bit.ly/yF9801. A majority of 
the nation’s taxpayers still generally subscribe to this same sentiment. See U.S. TREASURY 
DEP’T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 13, 14 (1984) 
(“Most Americans probably agree that those with high incomes should pay a greater 
percentage of their income in tax than those with intermediate levels of income.”). 
 30. See infra Part V.A. 
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III. SURROGATE TAXATION AND ITS UNDERLYING RATIONALES 
Surrogate taxes are not a historical novelty to the Code. Over the 
past several decades, Congress has imposed several varieties of such 
taxes.31 This part of the Article uses Code § 274(n) as a case study to 
illustrate the mechanics of how a surrogate tax operates and its 
underlying rationales. Code § 274(n) denies a deduction equal to 
fifty percent of a business-entertainment expense incurred. This 
surrogate tax was enacted in lieu of directly taxing the benefactors of 
business-entertainment expenditures.32 Instead, by denying a portion 
of an otherwise allowable expense, the taxpayer making the 
expenditure and the taxpayer receiving the benefit are each indirectly 
taxed; far from clear, however, is how these two parties share this tax 
burden.  
Consider a simple numerical example of how Code § 274(n) 
operates. Suppose Company X employs two equally qualified middle 
managers: Taxpayer A in technical support and Taxpayer B in sales. 
Company X periodically sends Taxpayer B to entertain prospective 
clients. Most recently, Company X gave Taxpayer B and Taxpayer C, 
a prospective client, courtside seats at a professional basketball game. 
The seats cost $100 apiece. Before the enactment of Code § 274(n), 
Company X could deduct the entire ticket purchase price of $200 (2 
× $100) under the general business expense category.33 After the 
enactment of Code § 274(n)34 and its subsequent amendments,35 
Company X can deduct only $100 ($200 (cost of tickets) × 0.50), 
rather than $200. Assuming that the income Company X earns is 
subject to a thirty-five percent marginal tax rate, this deduction 
 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See H.R. REP. NO. 111, at 645 (1993) (“[S]ome portion of business meal and 
entertainment expenses represent personal consumption (even if the expenses serve a 
legitimate business purpose).”). 
 33. For early examples of how the courts approached the deductibility of business 
entertainment expenses, see Appeal of McQuade, 4 B.T.A. 837, 840 (1926) (“In the light of 
the evidence, we are of the opinion that the amount spent in the purchase of such 
[entertainment] tickets constituted an ordinary and necessary expense of the taxpayer in the 
conduct of his liquor business and as such was deductible from gross income.”), and Appeal of 
Blitzer, 3 B.T.A. 696, 696 (1926) (holding that considerable entertainment expenses were 
deductible because such expenses were deemed to constitute “ordinary and necessary business 
expenses”). 
 34. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 142, 100 Stat. 2085, 2117, 2120. 
 35. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13209(a), 107 
Stat. 468, 469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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limitation produces an additional thirty-five dollar tax burden on the 
$100 that was disallowed as a deduction. 
There are two essential reasons for Code § 274(n)’s enactment. 
On the one hand, for reasons previously discussed,36 it would be 
inequitable and inadministrable to tax the recipients on the fair 
market value of business entertainment events. The subjective value 
of business entertainment is typically less than its fair market value, 
making taxation on the basis of the latter metric fundamentally 
unfair.37 Furthermore, in terms of administrative practicalities, no 
businessperson would be comfortable issuing a Form 1099 to each 
prospective or existing client in attendance at an entertainment 
event. Businesses would also likely be just as uncomfortable with the 
prospect of increasing the salary dollar figure on the face of each 
employee’s Form W-2 by the amount of entertainment expenditures 
expended on behalf of such employee. A more detailed explication of 
the direct taxation of the receipt of in-kind benefits at their fair 
market value would therefore prove unproductive.  
On the other hand, not taxing the value of these entertainment 
tickets at all is intolerable for the following three reasons: (1) income 
in the form of entertainment events (i.e., consumption) would 
otherwise go untaxed; (2) left unchecked, exempting business 
entertainment from the tax base generates a significant deadweight 
loss to the economy; and (3) employers would substitute tax-free 
remuneration for taxable remuneration, significantly narrowing the 
tax base. In the three subsections that follow, this analysis explores 
the merits of each of these rationales and how each contributed to 
the emergence of surrogate taxation. 
A. Mechanism to Tax Income 
When a businessperson and a guest attend an entertainment 
event, akin to paying attendees at the same event, each participates in 
an act of consumption. Nevertheless, neither the businessperson nor 
the guest is directly taxed.38 Considering the context in which 
business entertainment typically transpires, does this failure to tax 
make any sense? Certainly, it is not in an employer’s interest to 
shower its employees with costly goods and services that the 
 
 36. See supra Part II.  
 37. See supra Part II. 
 38. I.R.C. § 132(d) (2006). 
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employees do not substantially value. Similarly, it is not in the 
interest of a seller of goods or a provider of services to shower 
potential customers or clients (as well as its own employees) with 
entertainment opportunities that are not substantially valued by the 
recipients of those benefits.  
Consider the fact that the taxpayer who sponsors the business 
entertainment event can choose the events that it expects its 
employees and potential clients and customers will prefer. If, for 
example, the firm thinks its managers, rank-and-file employees, and 
customers are football fans, it will purchase box seats for a football 
game rather than for another kind of sporting event. By the same 
token, clients can be selective in the entertainment events they 
choose to attend, declining those events in which they have no 
interest and avoiding the social company of those whom they may 
dislike or abhor. In light of their ability to select those entertainment 
events that they are apt to find pleasurable, most taxpayers who 
attend an entertainment event in the context of “doing business” 
probably derive economic utility somewhat close to the full ticket 
value, on par with attendees who are at the event for a non-business 
purpose. 
 Concluding that businesspeople and their guests should bear 
some tax on the consumption associated with entertainment events is 
the easy part; the hard part is figuring out how to go about doing so. 
Rather than allow the income associated with such business 
entertainment expenditures to escape taxation completely, Congress 
chose to utilize surrogate taxation. More specifically, in 1986, in 
recognition of the personal consumption (a.k.a. income) inuring to 
the parties attending business entertainment events, Congress 
grafted subsection (n) to Code § 274, partially denying the host’s 
deduction of business entertainment expenses.39 As amended in 
1993, this provision now denies a deduction of fifty percent of the 
expenditure.40 This feature in the Code permits the indirect taxation 
of in-kind benefits such as business entertainment expenditures that 
would otherwise escape taxation in the recipient’s hands. Put 
differently, every dollar of deduction denied yields the same revenue 
as including the identical dollar benefit in income, assuming that the  
 
 
 39. See Tax Reform Act § 142. 
 40. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 13209(a). 
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taxpayer denied the deduction is taxed at the same effective tax rate 
as the taxpayer receiving the benefit.  
B. Mechanism to Minimize Deadweight Loss to the Economy 
As a general matter, any time the Code permits the tax-free 
receipt of income, a distortion is likely to occur in the form of a 
deadweight loss to the economy.41 This is because taxpayers will 
exploit benefits that are tax-exempt in nature even though the 
marginal utility that such benefits yield is lower than their 
concomitant costs. The tax-free receipt of business entertainment 
expenditures illustrates this point. 
Consider our earlier fact pattern in which Company X has two 
equally qualified middle managers, Taxpayer A in technical support 
and Taxpayer B in sales. Suppose that Taxpayer B’s weekly pay is 
$1000 plus $100 in the form of a tax-free in-kind benefit: a 
courtside basketball seat when he, at the behest of Company X, 
hosts a business entertainment event involving Taxpayer C, a 
potential customer. Assuming that business entertainment expenses 
are fully deductible (i.e., Code § 274(n) was not enacted), Company 
X is indifferent if it pays Taxpayer B $100 in the form of a (i) 
deductible cash payment or (ii) courtside basketball seat.42 But 
Taxpayer B is not so indifferent. Relative to the receipt of a cash 
payment in which Taxpayer B nets only sixty-five dollars after tax, 
the courtside basketball seat produces $100 worth of value. In light 
of this sixty-five dollars versus $100 differential, Taxpayer B will be 
driven to negotiate with Company X to get more courtside seats or 
other tax-free benefits in lieu of receiving taxable cash.  
This negotiation process for tax-free benefits between Taxpayer 
B and Company X will not, however, continue unabated. Unlike a 
cash payment that can be used to meet any of the taxpayer’s 
consumption needs,43 tax-free in-kind benefits do not offer such 
 
 41. For general discussions of the meaning of deadweight loss and its implications to the 
economy, see generally KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 442 (James 
Boyd ed., 5th ed. 1999); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 277–95 (Scott D. Stratford ed., 5th ed. 1989); HARVEY S. ROSEN, 
PUBLIC FINANCE 283–305 (Paul Shensa ed., 7th ed. 2005); HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, 
PUBLIC FINANCE 331 (Doug Hughes ed., 8th ed. 2008); David F. Bradford & Harvey S. 
Rosen, The Optimal Taxation of Commodities and Income, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 94 (1976). 
 42. Company X may not be indifferent if the labor market is truly efficient and 
Company X is in a position to exploit this efficiency. See infra Part III.C.  
 43. Calvin Johnson, An Employer-Level Proxy Tax on Fringe Benefits, 123 TAX NOTES 
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limitless choices. Thus, whereas the first courtside basketball seat 
may yield $100 of economic utility to Taxpayer B, each additional 
courtside ticket will produce progressively less economic utility. By 
the hundredth basketball game, the thrill of being seated courtside 
may begin to wear thin. Salary negotiations between Company X 
and Taxpayer B will likely strike an equilibrium point where Taxpayer 
B’s nth courtside seat produces economic utility equal to or slightly 
greater than sixty-five dollars, the amount of economic utility that an 
equivalent after-tax cash payment would yield.  
This equilibrium point is demonstrative. It pinpoints the exact 
deadweight loss that the economy suffers as a result of this income 
tax exemption. For virtually every dollar of in-kind benefit that 
Company X expends on behalf of Taxpayer B and that goes untaxed, 
the latter reaps less than one dollar of economic utility. At the 
extreme, driven by the apparent vacuum in the tax system that 
enables business entertainment income to escape taxation, the cost 
to the economic system is horrific: at some point along the 
expenditure cycle, for every dollar expended, an amount equal to or 
a little less than the marginal tax rate, here assumed to be thirty-five 
percent, is wasted. In terms of actual dollars, consider that at the nth 
basketball game, Taxpayer B derives only $65.01 of value by sitting 
courtside even though Company X has to spend $100 to purchase 
the ticket, signifying a $34.99 deadweight loss to the economy. Not 
only is this cost a net loss to the economy, but the government 
suffers as well: instead of collecting thirty-five dollars of tax related to 
the $100 remuneration that Company X pays Taxpayer B in the 
form of a courtside seat, it collects nothing.  
If properly instituted, surrogate taxation can eliminate the 
aforementioned deadweight loss to the economy. In the situation 
just described, the employer was indifferent if it paid Taxpayer B 
with cash or secured courtside basketball seats on Taxpayer B’s 
behalf (i.e., for income tax purposes, both were deductible). Were 
business entertainment expense deductions eliminated or such 
expenditures subject to an excise or withholding tax,44 Company X 
would shed this indifference. Instead, Company X would basically 
have two choices. Specifically, in lieu of using courtside seats as a 
form of remuneration, it would compensate Taxpayer B in the form 
 
483, 485 (2009) (“Cash allows each employee to maximize preferences.”).  
 44. See infra Part IV (describing various modes of surrogate taxation). 
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of deductible salary payments; alternatively, if it continued to use 
courtside seats as a form of remuneration, depending upon the 
elasticity of the labor market, Company X would likely reduce 
Taxpayer B’s overall compensation to recapture part of the additional 
tax cost it incurred in making the ticket purchase. 
C. Mechanism to Preserve the Tax Base 
Aside from taxing another’s income by proxy and curbing 
economic deadweight losses, surrogate taxation sometimes serves 
another role: it can be used to impose a tax on taxpayers who are in a 
position to exploit the receipt of tax-exempt income by another 
taxpayer.  
To demonstrate this point, the analysis returns to its prior 
example where Company X employs two equally qualified middle 
managers, Taxpayer A in technical support and Taxpayer B in sales. 
For purposes of this example, suppose that Taxpayer A’s weekly 
compensation is $1,100. Assuming a flat thirty-five percent tax 
rate,45 Taxpayer A will enjoy an after-tax benefit of $715 ($1100 × 
0.65). Suppose further that Taxpayer B’s weekly pay is $1000 plus 
$100 in the form of a tax-free in-kind benefit, such as a courtside 
basketball seat when he, at the behest of Company X, hosts a 
business entertainment event for Taxpayer C, a potential customer.46 
In this latter situation, assuming that Taxpayer B values the in-kind 
benefit at its fair market value, Taxpayer B will enjoy after-tax income 
of $750 (($1000 × 0.65) plus $100).  
The wage differential between Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B ($715 
versus $750) seems to call for a solution that is targeted at the 
employee level (e.g., levying a tax on Taxpayer B’s receipt of the in-
kind benefit). However, the outcome just described ignores the 
efficient labor market theory and the tendency of markets to seek 
 
 45. Of course, the federal income tax is imposed at graduated rates, so this assumption 
oversimplifies how the Code applies in practice. For heuristic reasons, this analysis assumes that 
Taxpayer A’s income was large enough that this $1100 weekly compensation payment was the 
taxpayer’s last income increment and, as such, was fully taxable within the thirty-five percent 
tax bracket. 
 46. This analysis assumes that all of these professional sporting events are offered to 
Taxpayer B as legitimate, business-entertainment expenditures and that he and a guest 
discussed or engaged in business before, during, or after the game. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2 
(2011) (distinguishing the nature of deductible business entertainment expenses from those 
that are nondeductible). 
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equilibrium.47 More specifically, a situation in which two equally 
qualified employees enjoy significantly different after-tax wages is 
inherently unstable. Over time, what we would expect to happen is 
that the after-tax wages of the two equally qualified individuals 
would ultimately be the same. In this particular instance, the point of 
equilibrium could be achieved by reducing Taxpayer B’s taxable 
income to $946, resulting in $715 of after-tax income (($946 × 
0.65) plus $100 of tax-free income). The economic disparities 
between Taxpayers A and B would thus disappear (i.e., both 
Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B would have after-tax income of $715). 
Notice, however, that it is the employer, not the employee, who 
captures the tax benefit associated with the deductibility of this in-
kind benefit that is tax-exempt to its recipient. More specifically, the 
employer’s cost of compensating Taxpayer A remains at $715 
($1100 salary less $385 ($1100 x 0.35) of tax savings), again 
assuming that the employer is taxed at a flat thirty-five percent rate; 
conversely, with respect to compensating Taxpayer B, the employer 
will incur a net cost of only $680 ($946 salary plus the $100 perk, 
less $366 ($1046 × 0.35) of tax savings). Viewed from the prism of 
the efficient labor market theory, Company X reaps a thirty-five 
dollar benefit ($715 less $680) because of Taxpayer B’s tax-free 
receipt of income in the form of courtside basketball tickets.  
Instead, consider the consequences if the Code were to deny 
Company X’s deduction for the $100 in-kind benefit that inured to 
Taxpayer B. The net cost of compensating Taxpayer B would 
accordingly be $715 ($946 salary plus $100 in-kind benefit, less 
$331 ($946 x 0.35) of tax savings).48 This is precisely the same tax 
outcome that befell Company X when it remunerated Taxpayer A 
with cash equivalent to the in-kind benefit, thereby suggesting its 
 
 47. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & 
MANAGEMENT 250–52 (1992) (describing the “efficient wage” model); Boris I. Bittker, 
Equity, Efficiency and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequalities?, 16 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979) (discussing how much and to what extent taxpayers can shift 
nominal tax burdens); see also Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 
J. POL. ECON. 288, 292–306 (1980) (describing the efficient labor market as it pertains to 
corporate managers). See generally Charles T. Clotfelter, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax 
Treatment of In-Kind Compensation, 32 NAT’L TAX J. 51, 52 (1979) (pointing out that 
employees who receive tax-free benefits will generally be paid less than those employees who 
receive only taxable wages). 
 48. Were Congress to deny a deduction, only the $946 salary would be deductible, 
yielding $331 ($946 x .35) of tax savings; because the $100 expenditure to purchase the $100 
perk would not be deductible, it would not produce any tax savings to Company X. 
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appropriateness. Simply put, denying a deduction in a case such as 
this would remove any incentive for an employer to find ways to 
compensate employees in nontaxable forms and garner the tax 
savings for itself. In the context of an efficient labor market, 
surrogate taxation is thus more equitable than allowing such in-kind 
benefits to go untaxed since it targets a potential beneficiary 
associated with the receipt of tax-free income, namely, the 
employer.49 
 
* * * 
 
Central to the viability of any income tax system is accurately 
measuring accretions to wealth,50 minimizing deadweight losses to 
the economy,51 and preserving the tax base.52 As evidenced by the 
foregoing discussion, surrogate taxation helps the Code achieve all 
three of these objectives. Not all surrogate taxes are designed in the 
same manner, however. In the next Part, this Article explores the 
salient characteristics of different forms of surrogate taxation.  
IV. DIFFERENT FORMS OF SURROGATE TAXES AND THEIR SALIENT 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Having explored the rationales that led to the emergence of 
surrogate taxation, the next issue is implementation. Although there 
are several possibilities, the three most viable methods of instituting 
 
 49. Admittedly, due to variations across the economic spectrum, the efficient labor 
model may not be universally applicable. For example, if there are opportunities to provide 
compensation in tax-free forms in some industries but not in others, then the entire wage 
structure of the perk-intensive industry will be lower and more lightly taxed. In the long run, 
this will attract additional capital to these industries until after-tax rates of return are 
equilibrated across the market. Assuming that capital markets are so fluid, the effect of 
permitting tax-free perks is unpredictable. If the demand curve for the goods and services 
offered in a perk-intensive industry is relatively elastic, consumers may find that they, rather 
than the employers, reap the benefits of tax rules that allow compensation to be paid in tax-
free forms. 
 50. See, e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (“Through 
provisions such as these, the Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the 
taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate 
calculation of net income for tax purposes.”) (citations omitted). 
 51. See generally David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax 
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
 52. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 96, 98 (2008) (“Congress, as 
early [as] 1917, sought to preserve the tax base of the United States.”). 
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surrogate taxation involve (A) the denial of an otherwise allowable 
deduction, (B) the imposition of an excise tax on the party making 
the expenditure, and (C) the placement of a withholding tax on the 
remunerating party. The three subsections below elaborate the 
salient characteristics of each form of surrogate taxation and 
highlight their concomitant advantages and disadvantages. Business 
entertainment expenditures are again used for explication purposes. 
A. Denial of Otherwise Allowable Deductions 
By way of background, expenditures that businesses incur that 
are “ordinary and necessary” in nature, subject to certain 
limitations,53 are usually deductible.54 The reason that such 
expenditures are deductible is that the amount expended constitutes 
a decline in income (i.e. the expended amount can no longer be 
consumed or result in the accretion of wealth).55 For example, if 
Company X were to purchase supplies (e.g., paper for its 
photocopying machine), the amount paid for such supplies would be 
deductible.56e 
On the surface, it seems that business entertainment expenses 
should share in the classification of being fully deductible because 
such expenditures fall with the purview of being ordinary and 
necessary in nature. Indeed, many businesspeople would argue that 
business entertainment is pivotal to the success of their businesses—
to wit, the incurrence of these expenses helps build bridges of trust 
and forge mutual understandings that are central to the formation of 
goodwill. And for many decades, consistent with the notion that 
business entertainment expenses are similar in nature to other 
business expenses, such expenditures were held to be fully 
deductible.57 
But there is something fundamentally different about the nature 
of business entertainment expenses that distinguishes them from 
 
 53. I.R.C. § 274 (2006). 
 54. Id. § 162(a). 
 55. In general, deductions for business expenses are predicated upon the principle that 
taxpayers who incur expenses to produce income should be taxed on a net, rather than a gross, 
basis. See, e.g., Hantzis v. Comm’r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[A] fundamental 
principle of taxation [is] that a person’s taxable income should not include the cost of 
producing that income.”). 
 56. I.R.C. § 162(a). 
 57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
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other business expenses. Business expenses normally give rise to 
taxable income in the hands of the party or parties benefiting from 
such expenditures (e.g., in our prior example, the purveyor of 
photocopying paper experiences taxable income upon the sale of its 
inventory);58 in stark contrast, business entertainment expenses do 
not generate income to the most immediate benefactors of such 
expenditures, namely, the hosts and guests of such business 
entertainment events.59  
Admittedly, not every deduction sanctioned under the Code 
gives rise to taxable income to another taxpayer. Indeed, sometimes 
there are overarching policy objectives that justify asymmetrical 
income/deduction outcomes. For example, employers often make 
deductible contributions to retirement accounts;60 these 
contributions are exempt from taxation in the hands of employees.61 
The reason for such asymmetrical tax treatment is to promote 
employee solvency during retirement.62 However, when it comes to 
business entertainment expenses, no such overarching policy grounds 
exist to justify an exemption from income in the recipients’ hands. 
To the contrary, as previously pointed out,63 there exist strong 
theoretical justifications for taxing both the host and guest who 
attend business entertainment events. Administrative impracticalities 
such as issuing Form 1099s to guests and capturing entertainment 
ticket values on Form W-2s for employees, however, make the 
“direct tax” approach a political nonstarter. Instead of simply 
allowing the income that inures to the host and guest to escape 
taxation, however, Congress has opted to employ a form of 
surrogate taxation whereby an otherwise legitimate deduction is 
curtailed or denied.64  
 
 58. I.R.C. § 1001(a). 
 59. Id. § 132(d). Another way to conceptualize the situation is as follows: the employer 
gives to the host and guests cash that is equal to the fair market value of the entertainment 
expense, and the host and guests then use that cash to make their purchases. 
 60. Id. § 402(a); see Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(i) (2011) (“If an employer makes a 
contribution for the benefit of an employee to a trust described in section 401(a) . . . the 
employee is not required to include such contribution in his income except for the year or 
years in which such contribution is distributed or made available to him.”). 
 61. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1). 
 62. See generally Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules and 
Their Critical Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qualified Plan Wealth, 2000 BYU L. REV. 
587.  
 63. See supra Part II.  
 64. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
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At least with respect to business entertainment expenses, there 
are several reasons why Congress selected this mode of surrogate 
taxation. Specifically, one of the major attractions of this surrogate 
tax form is its administrative ease. A deduction limitation centralizes 
the point of taxation on the host rather than upon each attendee at a 
particular business entertainment event.65 By centralizing the point 
of taxation, Congress has made it easier for the IRS to fulfill its 
oversight mission: the IRS can review the tax return of the taxpayer 
making these entertainment expenditures and gauge the legitimacy 
of the business nature of such expenses. This relieves the agency of 
the painstaking task of reviewing each and every tax return of the 
hosts and guests to determine if each included its value in income. In 
a similar vein, the IRS has a much greater financial incentive to 
conduct audits regarding the bona fides of business entertainment 
deductions incurred by a hosting taxpayer: if an audit reveals 
deduction improprieties (e.g., the business entertainment events in 
question served no legitimate business purpose), the resulting 
revenue would be much greater than the resulting revenue of case-
by-case audits of hosts or guests attending a single entertainment 
event.  
Another feature of deduction denials that make them politically 
attractive is their deep historical roots. Consider that for many 
decades before the institution of Code § 274(n), Congress, along 
with the Treasury Department, had instituted rules providing that 
business travel expenses that are primarily personal in nature are not 
deductible.66 For example, assume that a New York-based company 
sends one of its employees to a one-day business meeting in Florida 
and the employee, in order to soak up the sunshine, extends his stay 
for a week. The Code and pertinent Treasury regulations deny a 
deduction to the company for the cost of such travel expenses;67 
 
 65. See, e.g., IRS News Release IR-2007-184 (Nov. 6, 2007) (presenting a uniform and 
centralized means for federal and state employment officials to exchange information for 
purposes of employment tax audits). 
 66. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2); see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1) (2011). If a taxpayer travels to a 
destination and then engages in both business and personal activities, traveling expenses to and 
from the destination are deductible only if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer’s trade or 
business. If the trip is primarily personal in nature, the traveling expenses to and from the 
destination are not deductible even though the taxpayer engages in business activities while at 
the destination. 
 67. See, e.g., Robinson v. Comm’r, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1043 (T.C. Aug. 6, 1963) 
(concluding that although the taxpayer had a meeting that resulted in an item of business, the 
taxpayer’s trip was made primarily for sightseeing and other personal reasons and thus was not 
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neither the Code nor regulations, however, require the employee to 
include the company’s travel expenditures made on his behalf as 
income. This deduction denial coupled with the income exclusion is 
one of the earliest incarnations of surrogate taxation in the Code, 
setting forth a model for other Code sections and Treasury 
regulations to follow. 
A final factor that has made surrogate taxation politically 
attractive is that it is consistent with congressional attempts to keep 
marginal tax rates low. More specifically, in the last quarter-century, 
Congress has generally been more comfortable with denying 
deductions (and thereby broadening the tax base) as a mechanism to 
raise revenue than with increasing marginal tax rates.68 Evidence for 
the foregoing proposition is readily found in two Code sections that 
are emblematic of this congressional stance. Code § 67(a) denies 
deductions for “miscellaneous itemized deductions” except to the 
extent that they exceed two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income,69 and Code § 68(a) reduces taxpayers’ otherwise allowable 
itemized deductions by certain specified percentages.70 There is no 
theoretical logic that underlies either of these Code sections. Instead, 
these Code sections and others like them signify legislators’ 
apprehension about raising marginal tax rates. Surrogate taxes in the 
form of deduction denials are likewise consistent with this approach.  
B. Imposition of an Excise Tax on the Party Making the Expenditure 
The imposition of an excise tax on expenditures made by one 
party on behalf of another party represents a different form of 
surrogate taxation.71 That is, in lieu of directly taxing business 
entertainment benefactors (i.e., hosts and guests) or indirectly taxing 
them by denying the deductibility of such expenditures, Congress 
 
deductible). 
 68. See generally Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009). 
 69. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 132(a), 100 Stat. 2113, 2113. 
 70. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11103(a), 
104 Stat. 1388, 1406. 
 71. For a detailed exposition of using this form of surrogate tax, see Johnson, supra 
note 43. In his analysis, to create parity between taxpayers who receive cash and taxpayers who 
receive tax-free, in-kind benefits, Professor Johnson considers the appropriate excise tax rate to 
be fifty percent (rather than the thirty-five percent posited in this analysis). Professor Johnson’s 
proposed excise tax rate takes into account the fact that when a taxpayer bears another 
taxpayer’s tax liability, the tax payment itself constitutes an additional accretion to wealth that 
itself should be subject to tax.  
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could instead impose an excise tax (say, thirty-five percent) upon a 
party making such expenditures.72 In our prior example, if Company 
X were to purchase a $100 courtside basketball seat for Taxpayer B, 
Congress could impose a business entertainment excise tax of thirty-
five dollars ($100 × 0.35).  
Congress has not extensively used excise taxes as a form of 
surrogate taxation. However, on occasion, Congress has employed 
this method, reflecting its potential viability. Consider the little-
known excise tax found under Code § 4977(a). By way of 
background, under current law, employees who receive fringe 
benefits are taxed on the value of such benefits,73 unless certain 
exemptions enumerated under Code § 132 apply. Included within 
the scope of these exemptions are no-additional-cost services and 
qualified employee discounts.74 To qualify for either of these 
exemptions, however, an employee must work in the employer’s 
same line of business as such benefits are offered.75 By imposing this 
restriction, Congress apparently sought to ensure that employees 
employed in large conglomerates did not have an unfair advantage 
relative to employees who work in smaller business enterprises. When 
an employer operates a conglomerate and offers no-additional-cost 
services and qualified employee discounts, some of its employees may 
fail to meet the “same line of business” test and risk income 
inclusion. In lieu of including the value of such benefits in the 
employee’s gross income, an employer may elect to pay an excise tax 
equal to thirty percent on the fair market value of the benefit inuring 
to such employees.76  
In comparison to the direct taxation of in-kind benefits, which is 
fraught with valuation problems,77 liquidity concerns,78 and a host of 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(a) (2010).  
 74. I.R.C. §§ 132(b)–(c) (2006). 
 75. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-4(a)(1)(i) (“[A]n employee who does not perform substantial 
services in a particular line of business of the employer may not exclude from income under 
section 132(a)(1) or (a)(2) the value of services or employee discounts received on property or 
services in that line of business.”). 
 76. I.R.C. § 4977(a). 
 77. For example, what income-inclusion value should be attributable to attendance at an 
employer-sponsored, weekly cocktail party? An annual holiday party? Should the amount of 
taxation depend upon how much a particular employee eats or drinks at the event? The 
inability to answer these and other questions suggests that direct taxation is sometimes a 
logistic impossibility.  
 78. Historically, Congress has been sensitive to liquidity concerns. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 453 
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compliance problems,79 an excise tax has several potential advantages. 
First, imposition of an excise tax moots valuation issues. For 
example, if Company X purchases a $100 courtside seat on behalf of 
Employee B, Company X apparently believes that this expenditure is 
worth the ticket’s face value. Second, imposition of an excise tax 
obliterates liquidity concerns. This is because the party to be taxed 
controls the purse strings, making it ideally situated to balance the 
expenditures it chooses to make with the excise tax that it knows 
would ultimately be imposed upon it. Finally, imposition of an excise 
tax facilitates IRS oversight as it centralizes the point of taxation to 
one purchaser rather than to multiple benefactors.  
Excise tax imposition also has a distinct advantage relative to the 
mode of surrogate taxation that engenders the denial of otherwise 
allowable deductions. Surrogate taxation involves taxing a proxy in 
 
(stating that Congress permits taxpayers to use installment reporting); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 
19 (1926) (explaining that when Congress enacted the predecessor to I.R.C. § 453 as part of 
the Revenue Act of 1926, it sought to relieve taxpayers who sold property on an installment 
basis from having to pay an income tax in the year of sale based on the full amount of 
anticipated profits when in fact they had received in cash only a small portion of the sale price). 
But liquidity sensitivities have never extended to the receipt of in-kind benefits. Therefore, if 
taxpayers were obligated to pay tax on the receipt of in-kind benefits, including those that they 
either do not utilize (e.g., an employer-provided gym) or do not negotiate to obtain (e.g., a 
courtside basketball ticket while hosting a business entertainment event), they would likely 
consider themselves overtaxed. 
 79. When it comes to accurate tax reporting, third-party information returns are critical 
to ensure taxpayer compliance. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A 
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 13 (2006), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/otptaxgapstrategy%20final.pdf. See generally JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 34464, TAX GAP: ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE 
INFORMATION REPORTING ON MERCHANT PAYMENT CARD REIMBURSEMENTS (2008), 
available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19300.pdf; U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-266, COSTS AND USES OF THIRD-PARTY 
INFORMATION RETURNS (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08266.pdf.  
 In the absence of third-party information return issuance, tax compliance has historically 
been abysmal. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Role Third Parties Play in 
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 731 n.202 (2007) (“Collaborated evasion . . . may 
not only operate in small enterprises with fairly homogeneous employees. It may also be 
relevant to certain groups of workers in large enterprises . . . where tax avoidance, in the form 
of paying part of the total compensation in non-taxable fringe benefits, is a very common 
practice. Avoidance and evasion are closely related decisions . . . .” (quoting Gideon Yaniv, 
Collaborated Employee-Employer Tax Evasion, 47 PUB. FIN. 312, 313 (1992) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))). Accordingly, if the receipt of an in-kind benefit, such as 
attendance at a business-entertainment event, were not to entail the issuance of an information 
return (i.e., Form 1099), it is easy to anticipate that taxpayer compliance with reporting such 
income would likely be anemic.  
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lieu of the taxpayer who is in actual receipt of income. If the proxy, 
however, happens to have tax-exempt status under the Code or, 
alternatively, because of operating losses, has no immediate income 
tax exposure, denying a deduction to the proxy falls short of 
achieving effective surrogate taxation. By way of example, suppose 
the president of Duke University, a tax-exempt educational 
institution, invites potential donees to attend a Blue Devils’ game. If 
the Code denies the university a deduction, it is a nonevent from an 
income tax perspective: first, it fails to tax directly or indirectly the 
university’s president and prospective donees on the value of the 
courtside tickets that they received and from which they benefited; 
and second, due to its tax-exempt status, unless the university has 
unrelated business income,80 the tax deduction denial is nothing 
more than a mere book entry.  
A significant percentage of the U.S. economy is comprised of 
tax-exempt entities.81 Couple this fact with the reality that many 
companies have net operating losses that, at least on a temporary 
basis, effectively insulate them from tax. Deduction denials therefore 
have little or no impact on either sort of enterprise.82 In contrast, the 
imposition of an excise tax would still achieve the objective of 
indirectly taxing otherwise tax-free accretions to wealth, 
notwithstanding the tax status of the party making the expenditure 
(i.e., exempt or experiencing net operating losses). This makes excise 
tax imposition an attractive choice for some, but not all, surrogate 
tax purposes.83  
 
 80. See I.R.C. §§ 511–514.  
 81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-561T, GOVERNANCE, 
TRANSPARENCY, AND OVERSIGHT ARE CRITICAL FOR MAINTAINING PUBLIC TRUST 3–4 
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05561t.pdf (“[T]he tax-exempt sector 
comprises a significant part of the nation’s economy and workforce.”). 
 82. Some tax-exempt entities that earn unrelated business income are subject to tax on 
that income. I.R.C. § 511(a)(1). In such situations, denying a tax deduction may 
correspondingly increase the amount of unrelated business income that the tax-exempt entity 
must pay tax upon. See id. § 512(a)(1). Apart from tax-exempt entities, denying a tax 
deduction reduces the amount of loss that a taxpayer experiences, resulting in a smaller, net 
operating loss carryback or carryforward. Id. § 172(a). 
 83. The application of universal excise taxes raises some difficult political questions. For 
example, would a cancer ward center for children be subject to an excise tax if it hosted a 
birthday party for one of its patients? 
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C. Placement of a Withholding Tax on the Remunerating Party 
A third possible mode of surrogate taxation is the institution of a 
withholding tax. In other words, the Code could require that 
taxpayers be obligated to withhold a certain percentage (say, thirty 
percent) of any remuneration paid to or on behalf of another 
taxpayer and to remit the withheld amount to the government. For 
example, when it comes to non-U.S. persons84 and those taxpayers 
who do not supply correct identification numbers,85 withholding 
taxes of the sort just described are quite common.86  
From an administrative perspective, withholding on cash 
remuneration is relatively easy. For example, on a $100 dividend 
payment, thirty dollars of tax may be withheld, netting the intended 
dividend recipient seventy dollars. However, the same ease of 
administration does not extend to withholding on the receipt of in-
kind benefits. For example, if an employer supplies a $100 courtside 
ticket to one of its employees, it should withhold thirty dollars. 
Obviously unable to withhold from the actual basketball ticket itself, 
the employer must contribute its own thirty dollars to meet this 
withholding tax obligation, triggering an additional nine-dollar ($30 
× 0.30) withholding tax obligation on the initial thirty-dollar 
withholding obligation, which will itself result in another thirty 
percent withholding tax on the additional nine-dollar of out-of-
pocket expenses it incurred, and so on. 
When a withholding tax does apply, a flat tax rate is 
commonplace. Consider, too, that there is a built-in mechanism to 
bolster withholding tax compliance. A withholding agent must be 
compliant lest its derelictions are discovered and it is held financially 
responsible for the taxes that it failed to withhold.87 Not surprisingly, 
 
 84. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (defining “United States person”). 
 85. Id. § 3406(a). 
 86. In the sphere of foreign investment in the United States, the Code has developed an 
elaborate withholding-tax system on so-called FDAP (fixed, determinable, annual, or 
periodical) income. See id. §§ 871(a), 881(a), 1441(a). The Code has also developed an 
elaborate, backup withholding-tax system applicable to those taxpayers (1) who fail to provide 
a tax identification number, (2) who furnish an incorrect taxpayer identification number, (3) 
who are notified that backup holding applies, or (4) to whom the payee does not certify that it 
is not subject to backup withholding tax. See generally id. § 3406(a) (setting forth the 
statutory framework of the Code’s backup withholding-tax system). 
 87. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-7(c)(4) (2011); see also Lederman, supra note 79. In contrast, 
taxpayers have a financial incentive to cheat when it comes to direct taxation: if they are not 
caught, they are enriched by their malfeasance.  
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tax compliance is usually high in those instances when the Code 
utilizes withholding taxes as a mode of surrogate taxation.88 
The main disadvantage of using a withholding tax in lieu of a 
direct tax is a problem associated with the imposition of all surrogate 
taxes; namely, the fact that such taxes are not calibrated to the ability 
of any particular taxpayer to pay. What this means is that, in some 
instances, too little tax is withheld, and in other instances, too much 
tax is withheld. For example, a thirty percent withholding rate may 
be too low (e.g., if the taxpayer’s actual effective tax rate is thirty-five 
percent); alternatively, the thirty percent withholding rate may be 
too high (e.g., the taxpayer’s actual effective tax rate is twenty-five 
percent). In both cases, the thirty percent withholding tax misses its 
intended mark of substituting for a direct tax.89  
 
* * * 
 
This analysis illustrates the operation of the three most common 
forms of surrogate taxation, namely, the denial of allowable 
deductions, the imposition of an excise tax, and the institution of a 
withholding tax. There are advantages and disadvantages associated 
with the use of each form of surrogate taxation. For largely practical, 
historical, and political reasons, Congress has predominantly used 
deduction denials in the sphere of domestic taxation and 
withholding taxes in the sphere of foreign taxation, as modes of 
imposing surrogate taxation. Other countries (e.g., Australia) have 
favored excise taxes.90  
 
 
 88. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 6 (2005), available at http:// 
www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1524 (noting that in cases where a system 
of tax withholding is in place, estimates are that tax compliance among taxpayers is 
approximately ninety-nine percent); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-100T, 
TAX COMPLIANCE OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO REDUCE THE TAX GAP USING A VARIETY OF 
APPROACHES 10 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061000t.pdf (same). 
 89. Sometimes Congress recognizes the legitimacy of this concern and, depending on 
the circumstances, requires taxpayers to file an income tax return remitting the balance of any 
tax due or providing taxpayers with the opportunity to seek a refund. I.R.C. § 31(a)(1). Other 
times, Congress considers a withholding tax the final tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(b)(2)(i) 
(stating that on FDAP income, see supra note 86, a foreign investor is relieved of filing a tax 
return unless that taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business in the United States). 
 90. For a general overview of the Australian Fringe Benefits Tax, see JOHN WALKER, 
BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN AUSTRALIA 19 (Tax Mgmt. Portfolio 951-3d ed. 2006) (2000).  
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In the next Part, this Article examines how surrogate taxation 
makes the Code more functional and elaborates upon its varied uses.  
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF SURROGATE TAXATION AND ITS VARIED 
USES 
This Article has thus far examined the nuts and bolts of surrogate 
taxation, the rationales that underlie its imposition, and the three 
kinds of surrogate taxation that Congress has employed to date. This 
Article is now in a position to examine how surrogate taxation (A) 
fosters a good tax system and (B) can be used in a variety of 
contexts.  
A. Surrogate Taxation and Its Role in Fostering a Good Tax System 
While there are many ways to evaluate the efficacy of a tax 
system, the three most common criteria are whether such a system is 
equitable, efficient, and administrable.91 Surrogate taxation plays an 
important role in promoting each of these qualities under the Code. 
1. Surrogate tax’s role in promoting equity under the code 
Although the word equity connotes many meanings and is 
admittedly abstract in nature, in the tax context, it is often defined in 
terms of horizontal equity—namely, similarly situated taxpayers 
should bear the same tax burden92—and vertical equity—namely, 
those taxpayers who earn more income than other taxpayers (i.e., 
possess a greater ability to pay tax) should bear a larger proportion of 
tax.93 In other words, if two taxpayers, A and B, each earn $1000, 
 
 91. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) 
(stating that the traditional grounds for evaluating tax policy are efficiency, equity, and 
administrability); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191 (2008) (same).  
 92. See David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 43, 43 (2006); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 
NAT’L TAX J. 139 (1989); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical 
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993); Richard A. Musgrave, 
Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993). The concept of horizontal 
equity has a long, historical lineage, dating back several centuries. See THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 235 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651) (“To equal Justice, 
appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes.”); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 155 
(Donald Winch ed., 1970) (1848) (“For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters 
of taxation? For the reason, that it ought to be so in all affairs of government.”).  
 93. Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive 
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under the principle of horizontal equity, each should bear an equal 
tax burden, and if A earns $1,500 and B earns $1000, under the 
principle of vertical equity, A should pay proportionately more tax 
than B.  
Congress has generally sought to use surrogate taxation as a 
means to make the Code more equitable. Return again to our 
business entertainment example in which a host and guest each 
receive courtside tickets worth $100. Under the Code, neither the 
host nor the guest is taxed on the receipt of his ticket.94 Compare 
this result to one in which in lieu of $100 cash compensation, an 
employee is paid with a $100 courtside basketball ticket. In the latter 
case, the employee would be fully taxed on the ticket’s fair market 
value.95 While there is some justification for not taxing the ticket’s 
recipient in one situation and taxing him in the other,96 surrogate 
taxation helps close the gap between these disparate outcomes.  
Assuming that the sponsor of the business entertainment event is 
subject to the same effective tax rate as the host and guest, 
employment of a surrogate tax can help foster a more equitable 
outcome. For example, if the business entertainment sponsor, the 
host, and the guest are all subject to an effective thirty-five percent 
tax rate and the Code were to deny a deduction for the entire $200 
business entertainment expense (2 tickets × $100), an additional 
seventy dollars ($200 × 0.35) tax burden would befall the sponsor. 
This $70 tax burden is equivalent to the tax burden that would have 
arisen had the host and guest each been taxed on the receipt of his 
$100 ticket ((2 × $100) × .35).97 If the host and guest were to each 
bear a pro rata share of this tax (i.e., the host’s salary was 
correspondingly reduced by seventy dollars to cover this additional 
expense and the guest, who subsequently played host at the next 
business entertainment event, shouldered an equivalent tax burden),  
 
 
Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF 
TAXATION 3, 13–18 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980). 
 94. See I.R.C. § 132(d). 
 95. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(a) (2010). 
 96. See supra Part III (explaining the reasons why a host and a guest may enjoy a lesser 
amount of economic utility in the business rather than the nonbusiness context). 
 97. Depending on the elasticity of the labor market and other factors (e.g., if the 
sponsor and guest reciprocate in offering one another business-entertainment events), the host 
and guest ultimately may each bear the burden associated with the imposition of the surrogate 
tax.  
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then surrogate tax would have produced an appropriate and 
equitable solution to the in-kind benefit problem. 
When it comes to promoting equity under the Code, there are 
several reasons why surrogate taxation does not always operate with 
complete perfection. First, taxpayers are not all taxed at the same flat 
rate. Unlike the outcome portrayed by the example in the prior 
paragraph, depending upon each party’s different effective tax rate, 
the imposition of a surrogate tax may result in the parties being 
taxed too heavily or too lightly.98 Second, sometimes the taxpayer 
burdened by the surrogate tax (e.g., the sponsor in the prior 
example) may be in a position to shift the tax burden to the 
taxpayers actually experiencing the accretion to wealth (e.g., the host 
and guest in the prior example); other times, the burdened taxpayer 
will be able to shift the surrogate tax to other taxpayers whose 
income had not been increased.99  
2. Surrogate tax’s role in promoting efficiency under the code 
As it pertains to the Code, the word efficiency defies a ready 
definition. The classic definition of an efficient tax system is one that 
is neutral as to its effect on the free market.100 Other commentators 
disagree with this classic definition and argue that an efficient tax 
system is one that regulates and directs the free market.101 This 
Article has chosen to use a more generic, less politically charged, 
 
 98. See supra Part II. 
 99. Consider the result if the sponsor in the prior example were a publicly traded, 
corporate entity. The surrogate tax’s additional burden might be borne by the corporation’s 
shareholders, the corporation’s other employees, or the consumers of the corporation’s 
products instead of by the event’s host and guest. See George R. Zodrow, Incidence of Taxes: 
The Analysis and Measurement of Who Bears the Final Burden of a Tax, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 169 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999); Richard A. Musgrave, 
Karl E. Case & Herman Leonard, The Distribution of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits, 2 PUB. FIN. 
Q. 259, 261 tbl.1 (1974); Joseph A. Pechman & Mark J. Mazur, The Rich, the Poor, and the 
Taxes They Pay: An Update, 77 PUB. INT. 28, 31 tbl.1 (1984); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not 
to Praise the Corporate Income Tax, But to Save It, 56 TAX L. REV. 329, 354 n.54 (2003) 
(“Although the corporate income tax nominally falls (indirectly) on shareholders, the tax 
burden almost surely shifts, in part or in whole, from shareholders to employees, customers, 
and nonequity capital providers. Thus, its actual incidence is uncertain.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
807, 849 (2005) (“Tax policy typically invokes neutrality in a specifically economic sense. 
Economic efficiency is obtained when tax systems are neutral relative to a hypothetical no-tax 
world.”). 
 101. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST, AND MONEY (1964). 
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definition of the word efficiency, i.e., a tax system that produces as 
little deadweight loss to the economy as is possible.102 As defined by 
Professor Terrance O’Reilly, “[d]eadweight loss (also known as 
excess burden) measures, in monetary terms, the costs imposed by 
taxation beyond the amount of revenue raised. By raising the cost of 
certain resources, a tax can alter behavior, causing taxpayers to 
purchase less of some goods and more of others.”103 
In an earlier essay,104 Professor Calvin Johnson offers an excellent 
exposition of how the combination of deductions for business meals 
and other expenses of similar nature and the failure to tax as income 
the receipt of such business meals and other consumption items 
produces tremendous (and inexcusable) deadweight losses to the 
economy. To make his case, Professor Johnson contrasts two 
situations: one where an employer supplies an employee with a $100 
cash payment that is taxable and another where the same employer 
supplies the same employee with a $100 meal that is not taxable.105 
Because the $100 cash payment, on an after-tax basis (assuming a 
thirty-five percent tax rate), enables the employee to utilize only 
sixty-five dollars, the employee will generally prefer the receipt of the 
$100 tax-free meal, at least initially.106 Because of diminishing 
marginal utility, as the employee gradually receives more tax-free 
meals, an equilibrium point will be reached where the value of the 
nth additional meal will equal sixty-five dollars even though it will 
have a $100 price tag associated with its purchase.107 The thirty-five 
dollar delta in the foregoing example is a graphic illustration of the 
deadweight loss to the economy that some ill-conceived tax 
provisions are capable of generating.108 
Deadweight loss is a profound problem for the economy. 
Succinctly put by Professor Johnson, human happiness, measured in 
economic terms, could be as much as fifty-four percent higher were 
 
 102. See Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 61, 67 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
1985); CHARLES L. BALLARD, DON FULLERTON, JOHN B. SHOVEN & JOHN WHALLEY, A 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR TAX POLICY EVALUATION 8–9 (1985). 
 103. Terrance O’Reilly, Principles of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX REV. 583, 
585 (2008). 
 104. Johnson, supra note 43. 
 105.  Id. at 485–86.  
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id.  
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this deadweight loss to the economy eliminated.109 In numeric terms, 
instead of a spent dollar producing sixty-five cents’ worth of utility, 
the spent dollar would produce a dollar’s worth of utility; the thirty-
five cents (one dollar less sixty-five cents) of additional utility 
accounts for the fifty-four percent (thirty-five cents/sixty-five cents) 
increase in the taxpayer’s overall utility. Another compounding 
deadweight loss problem is that its presence constitutes a major 
revenue drain on the government, which is particularly distressing at 
a time of a hemorrhaging national deficit. 
When properly employed, surrogate taxation can serve as a useful 
tool to help eliminate or, at the very least, diminish deadweight 
losses to the economy. Assuming that a particular situation does not 
lend itself to the imposition of a direct tax,110 Congress can 
circumvent this problem by using some form of surrogate taxation to 
protect against deadweight economic losses. Surrogate taxation, 
when properly deployed, thus has the ability to function as a proxy 
for a direct taxation system, minimizing deadweight losses to the 
economy.111 
3. Surrogate tax’s role in promoting administrability under the code 
In order for a tax system to be administrable, at least two 
important conditions should be met: the costs to taxpayers in terms 
of time, money, and energy in fulfilling their tax compliance 
obligations should be manageable;112 and, in light of the amount of 
revenue raised, the government’s costs to administer the tax system 
and monitor tax compliance should be reasonable.113  
 
 
 109. Id. at 485. 
 110. See supra Part III. 
 111. See supra Part III.B. 
 112. See Nina Olsen, National Taxpayer Advocate, The Tax Gap, Hearing Before 
Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight, Senate Committee on Finance (July 26, 2006), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ntatestimonysfctax_gap072606.pdf (“For 
taxpayers who generally will go to great lengths to comply [with the tax law], the likely source 
of noncompliance is the complexity of the tax code. . . . For taxpayers who will comply if doing 
so is easy enough, our main emphasis should . . . be [on] simpler laws and procedures . . . .”). 
 113. See Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 
567, 572–74 (1965) (referring to this particular criterion as one of practicality). See generally 
THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (discussing 
general issues of tax administration that the Government encounters). 
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Employment taxes are representative of an administrable tax.114 
Taxpayers and the IRS alike ordinarily find compliance and oversight 
of such taxes to be straightforward. Employment taxes are withheld 
from taxpayers’ wages by their employers,115 and the withheld taxes 
are then paid by the employers to the government.116 The IRS can 
easily monitor employment tax compliance because the imposition of 
such taxes involves the issuance of information returns,117 and the 
point of compliance is centralized in the hands of employers rather 
than with each individual employee.  
 By way of contrast, an example of a much more difficult tax to 
administer is the state use tax. Such taxes are designed to 
complement state sales taxes.118 When a taxpayer purchases an out-
of-state item and is a resident of a state with a sales tax, the taxpayer 
is supposed to pay a use tax on the difference between sales tax in the 
state in which the item is being consumed and the sales tax (if any) 
that the taxpayer actually paid.119 The challenge for state tax 
authorities is to identify those items that taxpayers purchased out-of-
state. Because of registration issues, some items purchased out-of-
state are easy to identify (e.g., automobiles); the vast majority of 
other items purchased out-of-state, however, are far less easy to 
identify. As a result of this administrative shortcoming, compliance 
with respect to such taxes is virtually nonexistent.120  
Sensitive to resulting administrative burdens, Congress has 
decided that taxing some categories of income is not cost-justified. 
Consider the case of de minimis fringe benefits. Such benefits 
undoubtedly constitute income;121 nevertheless, Congress exempts 
such income from tax.122 Why? Congress does not want to force 
 
 114. I.R.C. § 3101(a)–(b) (2006). 
 115. Id. § 3102(a). 
 116. Id. §§ 3401(a), 6302(a). 
 117. Id. § 6501(a). 
 118. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION II: SALES 
AND USE, PERSONAL INCOME, AND DEATH AND GIFT TAXES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITIES ¶ 16.02 (3d ed. 2001). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Brian S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic 
Commerce: E-Confusion or E-Collection, 79 N.C. L. REV. 203, 206 (2000) (“Absent 
substantive reform in the collection of use tax on interstate commerce, the states will continue 
to lose use tax revenue that buyers clearly owe under existing laws.”). 
 121. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(d) (1991). 
 122. I.R.C. § 132(e). 
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taxpayers to keep track at work of every personal photocopy they 
make, every cup of coffee they drink, and every holiday office party 
they attend. The administrative nightmare of keeping track of all of 
these items, coupled with the IRS’s inability to readily monitor 
compliance, does not justify whatever might be the resulting revenue 
associated with taxing such de minimis fringe benefits. 
In other instances, despite administrative apprehensions, 
Congress has decided to tap alternative means to impose a tax. In 
these instances, Congress has resorted to applying surrogate taxes to 
alleviate the administrative burdens that direct taxation would 
otherwise engender.123 Put differently, the proxy who bears a 
surrogate tax, yet whose income is not increasing, is presumably in a 
much better position, relative to the income recipient, to handle a 
deduction denial, bear the imposition of an excise tax, or endure a 
withholding tax. Furthermore, a serendipitous feature of surrogate 




 123. Although they are generally designed to ameliorate administrative compliance issues, 
surrogate taxes admittedly generate their own set of administrative concerns. One particular 
concern relates to the inability of surrogate taxes to capture income that does not immediately 
vest in the hands of a particular taxpayer. To demonstrate, consider the tax consequences to an 
employer that spends $70,000 refurbishing an existing building wing into an on-premises gym 
for its employees. If the employer built a new building wing and added a gym, it would have 
cost $500,000. Suppose the gym costs the employer $30,000 a year to operate, its employees 
pay nothing to use its amenities, and normal membership in a gym of this quality would be 
$1000 annually. Under the deduction denial mode of surrogate taxation, the employer would 
be precluded from deducting the $30,000 of annual expenses it incurs in maintaining the gym. 
Under the excise tax mode of surrogate taxation, the employer bears a $300 annual excise tax 
($1000 x .30) on a per-employee basis. Under the withholding mode of surrogate taxation, 
the employer should remit $1538 ($1000 / 1 − 0.35) on a per-employee basis to the 
government to account for the $1000 benefit inuring to the employee plus the tax gross-up. 
Yet, it remains unclear under all these modes of surrogate taxation how the $70,000 
conversion expense or the $500,000 cost of constructing a new gym would fit into the 
surrogate tax regime.  
 Another administration problem is that taxpayers are not likely to respond passively to 
surrogate taxes. To the contrary, crafty taxpayers will be inclined to reclassify nondeductible 
expenses—expenses that might give rise to an excise tax and expenditures that result in the 
imposition of a withholding tax—into a deductible form of expense—an expense that does not 
give rise to an excise tax—or a form of income that does not give rise to a withholding tax. For 
example, in the case of business-entertainment expenses, some taxpayers would likely reclassify 
the expenses as advertising/promotional expenses that would be fully deductible. I.R.C. § 
162(a). The IRS can monitor taxpayers’ expense (mis)classifications, but such monitoring is 
likely to be a labor-intensive endeavor, subverting one of the underlying goals of the surrogate 
tax—namely, to foster administrative ease.  
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hands of a single taxpayer rather than widespread over numerous 
individual taxpayers, thereby facilitating IRS oversight.124  
 
* * * 
 
As evidenced by this Part of the Article, surrogate taxation is 
designed to supplement direct taxation, not supplant it. Despite its 
shortcomings, on the whole, surrogate taxation makes several 
important contributions to the Code, enhancing its equity, 
efficiency, and administrability. Most importantly, it imposes costs—
and, hence, incentives to minimize those costs—on the party who 
has the greater control over the manner in which the transaction is 
structured. For example, the provider/supplier of the in-kind 
benefits should know its own costs and should have some sense as 
well of how this benefit might be viewed by its recipients. The 
provider/supplier can also factor its own overtaxation into its 
negotiations in the future with the in-kind recipients over the 
amount of their cash wages, thereby recouping all or much of the tax 
cost imposed on the provider/supplier in the first instance. 
Furthermore, the surrogate approach minimizes the costs of 
collection because in most situations of this sort, there will be far 
fewer payers than payees.  
Finally, surrogate taxation minimizes the sting of overtaxation. 
The employee who faces an effective marginal tax rate approaching 
or exceeding one-hundred percent will deeply resent the rule that 
dictates that result and the tax system that imposes it. As a group, 
employers are fewer in number than employees, they are often 
artificial entities that do not experience resentment in any 
meaningful way, and they may even be staffed by executives who are 
sophisticated enough to appreciate the virtues of the surrogate tax 
mechanism, which would predictably diminish any resentment that a 
particular form of surrogate tax engenders.  
As is apparent by the material in the next Part of this Article, the 
virtues of surrogate taxation make it a commonplace phenomenon 
under the Code.  
 
 124. See Lederman, supra note 79. 
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B. Congressional Employment of Surrogate Taxation 
Because of its versatility and utility, Congress has sought to 
assign a wide array of duties to surrogate taxation. Thus far, this 
Article has examined its use primarily from the vantage point of 
business entertainment expenses. In the subsections that follow, this 
Article discusses several other representative surrogate taxes, 
highlighting the utility of this tool.125 
1. Code § 274(c): a deduction denial 
Domestic business travel expenses are deductible if the nature of 
the trip is primarily business, rather than personal, in nature.126 Code 
§ 274(c) limits the application of this rule in the case of foreign 
travel.127 That is, if the trip has both business and personal 
components, only the business-related portion of the travel expenses 
is deductible. For example, assume that an employee must travel 
from New York to Montreal for a six-day business meeting and the 
round-trip flight costs $900. Assume further that the employee stays 
in Montreal visiting friends for an extra three days. Since the trip is 
primarily business in nature, the cost of airfare is deductible—to an 
extent:128 Code § 274(c) limits the amount of the deduction relating 
to the trip’s airfare to $600 ($900 × 6/9), i.e., that proportion of 
the trip that was business-related.129 Rather than deem the employee 
taxable on $300 (the portion of the travel expenses related to the 
 
 125. While this analysis does not necessarily agree, at least some commentators have 
argued that the entire gift and estate tax regime is a surrogate tax. These commentators assert 
that transfer taxes are designed to tax unrealized gain that would otherwise escape taxation 
because of the “basis equals fair market value” rule enunciated under I.R.C. § 1014(a). See, 
e.g., Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 
1183, 1191 (“With a seriously eroded income tax base, a transfer tax is needed to ensure that 
each taxpayer eventually bears a fair share of the tax burden.”). 
 126. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1). 
 127. I.R.C. § 274(c)(1) (“In the case of any individual who travels outside the United 
States . . . in pursuit of trade or business . . . no deduction shall be allowed under section 162. 
. . .”); I.R.C. § 274(c)(2) (“Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the expense of any travel outside 
the United States . . . if such travel does not exceed one week, or the portion of the time of 
travel outside the United States . . . not attributable to the pursuit of the taxpayer’s trade or 
business . . . is less than 25 percent of the total time on such travel.”). 
 128. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2). 
 129. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(g)(Example (7)).  
DO NOT DELETE 2/2/2012 12:01 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
190 
trip’s personal component), Congress has chosen to deny the 
employer a deduction of an equivalent dollar amount.  
Emerging from this deduction denial are several important 
observations. One pertains to administrability: Congress apparently 
did not feel it practical to tax the employee on the portion of travel 
expenses that she was able to exploit for her personal use (i.e., 
$300). Another observation pertains to efficiency: if Congress did 
not limit the deductibility of this expense, employers might 
otherwise use such expenditures as a tax-free perk to employees, 
injecting a deadweight loss into the economy.130 A final observation 
pertains to equity: depending upon the elasticity of the labor market, 
the employee who enjoys this benefit/accretion to wealth will bear 
part of the surrogate tax burden in the form of lower wages or a 
reduction of other benefits.131  
2. Code § 4972: an excise tax 
Code § 4972 imposes a ten percent excise tax on nondeductible 
contributions made to certain qualified retirement plans.132 Rather 
than impose a tax on the additional benefits that were to inure to 
employees via these excess contributions, Congress chose to impose 
an excise tax upon the plan sponsor. The reason for this excise tax is 
that tax-exempt plans generally preclude easy participant access to 
funds,133 putting the ability to rectify funding problems out of reach 
of plan participants. Surrogate taxation in the form of an excise tax 
obviates this problem: the plan sponsor has the liquidity to bear this 
excise tax (lest it would not have made the excess contribution in the 
first place) and is also in a position to take remedial action and 
recoup the excess payment.134  
 
 130. See supra Part III.B. 
 131. See supra Part III.C. 
 132. These are plans qualified under I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 403(a), 408(k), 408(p). I.R.C. § 
4972(d)(1)(A). While highly technical in nature, nondeductible contributions are essentially 
the sum of (i) the excess of the employer’s contribution for the tax year over the amount 
allowed as a deduction under I.R.C. § 404 and (ii) the nondeductible contributions for the 
preceding tax year reduced by amounts returned to the employer or applied as deductible 
contributions in the current year. I.R.C. § 4972(c). 
 133. Id. § 72(t)(1). 
 134. Id. § 4972(c)(3). 
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3. Code § 1441: a withholding tax 
Code § 1441 imposes a thirty percent withholding tax on so-
called FDAP (fixed, determinable, annual, or periodic in nature) 
income (e.g., interest, dividends, and royalties) earned by foreign 
investors, coupled with a withholding duty on the payer.135 The 
reason Congress chose to impose this indirect tax is that from an 
administrative perspective, the IRS otherwise would have little or no 
recourse to collect taxes owed in courts of foreign jurisdictions had 
the recipients of such income not fulfilled their tax paying 
obligations to the United States.136 In those instances when 
nonresident alien taxpayers are subject to this withholding tax, they 
need not file an income tax return137 because the withholding tax is 
deemed to represent the full amount of tax due. 
 
* * * 
 
While surrogate taxes produce salutary effects, they have their 
limitations. Therefore, Congress should restrict their use to when 
collection obstacles necessitate taxation of the surrogate in lieu of an 
unreachable income recipient (e.g., nonresident aliens). Direct taxes 
on the income recipient remain the method of first choice because 
direct taxes can be tailored to address the circumstances of the 
individual taxpayer.138  
VI. CONCLUSION 
When and where possible, Congress prefers direct rather than 
indirect taxation of income. The reasons for this preference are 
obvious: direct taxation is apt to be more exacting, and the 
 
 135. Id. § 1441(a)(1). 
 136. See, e.g., European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 424 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“Under the long-standing common law doctrine known as the ‘revenue rule,’ the courts of 
one nation will not enforce final tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims of other nations.”). 
 137. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6012-1(b)(2)(i), -2(g)(2)(i) (2006). 
 138. Payers, for example, do not usually know how many mouths a payee may have to 
feed or what other sources of income the payee may be able to call upon in discharging her 
support obligations and in meeting her own consumption needs. Payers likewise do not 
necessarily know how much a particular payee may contribute to charity or pay to others in the 
form of alimony or state and local taxes. The appeal of a direct tax is that each taxpayer 
possesses unique knowledge of his own circumstances, enabling him to assess his personal tax 
burden on the basis of these self-reported circumstances. 
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compliance burden falls squarely on the appropriate party (i.e., the 
party experiencing an accretion to wealth). Prompted largely by 
administrative concerns, however, direct taxation is not always 
logistically possible. In these situations, surrogate taxation takes 
front-and-center stage.  
In the appropriate circumstances, surrogate taxation produces 
equitable, efficient, and administrable outcomes. The limitation on 
the deductibility of business entertainment expenses demonstrates 
this point, illustrating that surrogate taxation has a number of 
venerable characteristics that can assist in augmenting the 
functionality of the Code.139  
For years, the receipt of in-kind benefits has confused and 
confounded tax theorists, particularly regarding the vexing issue of 
valuation.140 In the past, these tax theorists have primarily focused 
their attention on the in-kind benefit recipient. This analysis instead 
focuses attention on the provider of such in-kind benefits, 
highlighting the important role that surrogate taxation has thus far 
played in the Code’s development and other roles that it may play in 
the future. And while admittedly the application of surrogate 
taxation may not supply the “right” answer to the in-kind benefit 
valuation riddle—indeed, because there may not be one—it 
nonetheless provides a practical response to the question itself, 
namely, how the Code should go about the taxation of in-kind 
benefits (and other forms of income) that, due to administrative 
reasons, would otherwise go untaxed. 
 
 139. Richard Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, Elimination of the Deduction for Business 
Entertainment Expenses, 123 TAX NOTES 757 (2009). 
 140. See supra note 1. 
